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COMMENTS

that foreign bases be manned in the most efficient manner. It
is submitted that questions of discipline, as well as of morale and
security, are relevant considerations in this area.
It appears that these decisions could have been avoided by
using the Necessary and Proper Clause to sustain military jurisdiction over employees and dependents. The cases seem unfortunate when viewed against the lack of practicable answers to
the problem of where these persons will be tried and the unsatisfactory consequences which will probably flow from the adoption
of any of the available solutions.
James A. George

The Wife's Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium
Prior to 1950 the right of a wife to recover for loss of consortium" resulting from the negligent injury of her husband by
a third person was not recognized. 2 In that year, however, in
the landmark case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 3 the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia recognized the wife's right to
such recovery. This decision has resulted in an extensive reexamination of the question by courts in many other jurisdictions. It is the purpose of this Comment to determine the present status of this right and to examine the bases of the decisions.
The concept of consortium originated in the early common
law as a right in the husband to the material services of his
wife. 4 With the passage of time, this concept was expanded to
include other components of the marriage relation- society,
sexual relations, and conjugal affection." At common law the husband's interest was protected against such interferences with the
1. Consortium has been defined as "conjugal fellowship of husband and wife,
and the right of each to the company, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other
in every conjugal relation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY (4th ed. 1957).
2. See note 15 infra.
3. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950). There
were two major holdings of the Hitaffer decision - (1) a wife has a cause of
action for loss of consortium resulting from negligent injury of her husband by a
third person, and (2) that this right was not barred by the "exclusive remedy"
provision of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The
second holding has been overruled subsequently. See note 20 infra.
4. See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139; Lippman, The Breakdown of Conaortium, 30 COLUm. L. REv. 651 (1930).
5. See PROSSER, TORTS 683 (2d ed. 1955) ; Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Con8ortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1923) ; Lippman, The Breakdown of
Conaortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 662 (1930). These three aspects have been
labeled the "sentimental components" of marriage.
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marital relationship as enticement, criminal conversation, and
alienation of affections. 6 In addition, his interest was afforded
protection against tortious physical injury to the wife causing
deprivation of her services or society. 7 The common law, however, did not allow recovery for loss of consortium to the wife.8
The basis for this denial is disputed. One view is that the wife
lacked a substantive right. 9 Another view is that although a substantive right did exist, it was held in abeyance because of incapacity to sue in her own name.' 0 After the passage of Married
Women's Emancipation Acts giving the wife the legal capacity
to bring actions in her own name, the rights of both spouses were
subjected to a re-examination. Most jurisdictions continued to
recognize the husband's right." Some courts, however, reasoning that the action for loss of consortium was based only on the
loss of services and that after these Acts the husband was no
longer entitled to the services, disallowed his right to recover for
loss of consortium caused by physical injury to the wife. 2 As to
6. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904) (criminal conversation) ; Multer v.
Knibbs, 193 Mass. 556, 76 N.E. 762 (1907) (enticement); Egbert v. Greenwalt,
44 Mich. 245, 6 N.W. 654 (1880) (criminal conversation) Heermance v. James,
47 Barb. 120 (N.Y. 1866)

(alienation of affection).

See PROSSER, TORTS 684-95

(2d ed. 1955).
7. Brockbank v. The Whitehaven Junction Ry., 7 H. & N. 834, 158 Eng. Rep.
706 (1862). See PROSSER, TORTS § 104 (2d ed. 1955) ; Holbrook, The Change in
the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1923).
8. 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 611, 639 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 690 (2d ed.
1955).
9. Nash v. Mobile & O.R.R., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928) ; Bernhardt v.
Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918); Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1952]
A.C. 716, 2 All E.R. 394; Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium,
22 Mimi. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1923) ; Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 651, 664 (1930). And see 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES *142,
wherein a reason for this is suggested: "[T]he inferior hath no kind of property
in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, . . . and therefore can suffer
no loss or injury."
10. The only early authority in favor of the existence of the right is a dictum
of Lord Campbell in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 589, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 859
See Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889).
See also
(1861).
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950) : "That these rights existed
prior to the passage of the Married Women's Act cannot be doubted. The Act
simply removed the wife's disability to invoke the law's protection."
11. Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coppedge, 116 Ark. 334, 172 S.W. 885
(1915) ; Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Small, 277 Ky. 189, 126 S.W. 143 (1939) ;
Guevin v. Manchester Street Ry., 78 N.H. 289, 99 Atl. 298 (1916). See PROSSER,
TORTS 701 (2d ed. 1955). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 693 (1938) : "One who
by reason of his tortious conduct is liable to a married woman for illness or other
bodily harm is subject to liability to her husband for the resulting loss of her
services and society, including any impairment of her capacity for sexual intercourse, and for any reasonable expense incurred by him in providing medical
treatment."
12. Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911) ; Taylor v.
S. H. Kress & Co., 136 Kan. 155, 12 P.2d 808 (1932) ; Bolger v. Boston Elevated
Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910) ; Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184
Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915) ; Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821,
32 S.E.2d 711 (1945) ; Martin v. United Electric Rys., 71 R.I. 137, 42 A.2d 897

1960]

COMMENTS

the wife, the courts generally recognized her right to maintain
actions for alienation of affections, enticement, and criminal
conversation.1 3 In addition, some jurisdictions allowed her to
recover against persons who sold habit-forming drugs to her
husband. 14 Nevertheless, it was consistently held that the wife
had no cause of action for loss of consortium where the husband
was injured by a third person. 15
Notwithstanding the great weight of authority to the contrary, it'was held in the 1950 case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.
that a wife had a cause of action for loss of consortium where
she was deprived of her husband's assistance, enjoyment, and
sexual relations by an injury to his person resulting from the
negligence of a third person.' 6 Since this decision, the same question has been presented to courts in several other jurisdictions.
(1955) ; Golden v. R. L. Green Paper Co., 44 R.I. 231, 116 Atl. 579 (1922) ; Floyd
v. Miller, 190 Va. 303, 57 S.E.2d 114 (1950). For further development in Virginia,
see Comment, 46 VA. L. REV. 184 (1960).
13. Parker v. Newman, 200 Ala. 103, 75 So. 479 (1917) (alienation of affection) ; Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 AtL 1027 (1889) (alienation of affection)
Roberts v. Roberts, 230 Ky. 165, 18 S.W.2d 981 (1929) (criminal conversation)
Wolf v. Frank, 92 Me. 138, 48 Atl. 132 (1900) (alienation of affection) ; Bradstreet v. Wallace, 254 Mass. 509, 150 N.E. 405 (1926) (enticement) ; Oppenheim
v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923) (criminal conversation) ; Bennett
v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889) (enticement) ; Rott v. Goehring,
33 N.D. 413, 157 N.W. 294 (1916) (alienation of affection) ; Newsom v. Fleming,
165 Va. 89, 181 S.E. 393 (1935) (criminal conversation).
14. Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912) (defendant
had wilfully sold excessive quantities of harmful drugs to the husband despite the
protests of the wife, resulting in husband's confinement in an asylum) Moberg v.
Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917) (allowed wife to recover for damages
suffered by reason of sale of opium to husband). See 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 697 (1938). Some courts extended this rule to include the sale of intoxicating
liquor to the husband. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 534, 104 P.2d 147 (1947) ; Swanson
v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940). Cf. Work v. Campbell, 164 Cal. 343,
128 Pac. 943 (1912) (defendant knowingly made false statements concerning plaintiff's husband which caused her to send him away).
15. Feneff v. New York C. & H. R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
See cases collected in Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1366, 1389 (1952), and cases in footnote 5 of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 812-13, 23 A.L.R.2d 1366, 136769 (1950) ; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 695 (1938).
The experience of the North Carolina court is interesting. The court first
recognized the wife's right (Hipp v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9,
108 S.E. 318 (1921)), then denied it (Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189
N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307, 37 A.L.R. 889 (1925)), and finally resolved the matter
by denying it to both spouses (Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32
S.E.2d 611 (1945)).
The wife's right was recognized in Griffin v. Cincinnati Realty Co., 27 Ohio
Dec. 585 (1913) ; however, the contrary rule was adopted in Smith v. Nicholas
Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1913).
For other judicial rumblings prior to Hitalfer v. Argonne Co., see McDade v.
West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299 (1949) (evenly divided court) and the dissenting opinions in Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462, 13 A.L.R.
1320 (1918) and Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 270 N.Y. Supp. 534
(1934).
16. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 23 A.L.R.2d 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
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In the re-examination of the action for loss of consortium since
the decision most jurisdictions have refused to follow the Hitaf-

fer decision. 17

However, the wife's cause of action has been

recognized by several courts18 and, in two very recent decisions,
by the supreme courts of Michigan 19 and South Dakota. 20 Never17. Filice v. United States, 217 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1954) (applying California
law. Of. Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449
(1958)) ; Seymour v. Union News Co., 217 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1954) (applying
Illinois law) ; O'Niell v. United States, 202 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (applying
Maryland law. Compare with Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37,
113 A.2d 82 (1954)) ; Jeune v. Del E. Webb Const. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d
723 (1954) ; Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449
(1958) ; Franzen v. Zimmerman, 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 897 (1953) ; Ripley v.
Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952) ; LeEace v. Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry., 249 S.W.2d
534 (Ky. 1952) ; Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82
(1954) ; Don v. Benjamin M. Knapp, Inc., 200 N.Y. 675, 117 N.E.2d 128 (1954),
affirming 281 App. Div. 892, 893, 119 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (1953) ; Passalacqua v.
Draper, 279 App. Div. 660, 107 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1951), reversing 199 Misc. 827,
104 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1951) ; Larocca v. American Chain & Cable, 23 N.J. Super.
195, 92 A.2d 811 (1952) ; Nelson v. A. M. Lockett & Co., 206 Okla. 334, 243 P.2d
719 (1952) ; Ash v. S. S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash.2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953)
Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205 (1955)
Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1952] A.C. 716; [1952] 2 All E.R. 394; [1951] 2
K.B. 639, [1951] 2 All E.R. 116; [1950] 2 All E.R. 798 (Leeds Assizes).
The following decisions, although refusing to recognize the wife's cause of
action, expressed an attitude sympathetic to the view of the Hitaffer decision.
Kronenbitter v. Washborn Wire Co., 5 Misc.2d 961, 159 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1957)
(court indicated it thought rule was illogical and an anachronism and stated it
would be inclined to follow the trend since Hitaffer) ; Lurie v. Mammone, 200
Misc. 320, 107 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1951) ; Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
Compare the plight of the federal courts sitting in diversity cases. In Werthan
Bag Corp. v. Agnew, 202 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1953), although much impressed with
the reasoning of the Hitaffer decision, the court felt that it was not free to declare
the law of Arkansas to be contrary to the overwhelming weight of state court
authority. But of. Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351,
299 S.W.2d 41 (1957) (Arkansas court recognized the wife's action). See Josewski v. Midland Constructors, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 681 (D. S.D. 1953). The court
stated that Hitaffer may be the beacon, but that the light must first be seen by
the state courts if the ruling was to be recognized in the federal courts outside
the District of Columbia. That the South Dakota court saw the light, see Hoekstra v. H'elgeland, 98 N.W.2d 699 (S.D. 1959), Cf. Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F.
Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953), holding that the law of Nebraska would recognize the
wife's right.
18. Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953), noted in 41 GEO.
L.J. 443 (1953) (applying Nebraska law) ; Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v.
Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957), noted in 57 COLUJm. L. REV. 902
(1957) and 18 U. PITT. L. REV. 842 (1957) ; Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches,
Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953), noted in 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 223
(1954) and 23 U. CIN. L. REV. 108 (1954) ; Acuff v. Schmitt, 248 Iowa 272, 78
N.W.2d 480 (1956), noted in 42 IowA L. REv. 634 (1957) and 55 MIcH. L. REV.
721 (1957).
Lower courts in two states have recognized the wife's right, but were later
overruled on appeal. Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 319 P.2d 357 (Cal. App.
1957), rev'd, 50 Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958) ; Passalacqua v. Draper, 199
Misc. 827, 164 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1951), rev'd, 279 App. Div. 660, 107 N.Y.S.2d 812
(1951).
19. Montgomery v. Stephen, 101 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1960).
20. Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1959). A significant aspect
of this case which is outside the scope of this Comment is the disposition of the
wife's claim for loss of consortium after the death of the husband. The court
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theless, it appears that the majority rule today is that the wife

has no cause of action for loss of consortium where the husband
is injured by a third person.
Under the Louisiana jurisprudence neither spouse has been
allowed recovery for loss of consortium by reason of enticement
and alienation of affections or of physical injury to the spouse.
In the leading case of Moulin v. Monteleone,21 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that there was no action for alienation of affections in Louisiana. Although this case involved only an action
for alienation of affections, the court stated that there is no
cause of action for the loss of the companionship, services, and
denied recovery on the ground that the wrongful death statute was the exclusive
remedy of a spouse after the other's death.
It can be seen that if an action for negligent impairment of the consortium is
recognized by the courts, there develops a problem of reconciling this action with
existing statutory remedies such as the Workmen's Compensation Acts and the
Wrongful Death Statutes. As a general rule, the courts have held that the remedy
provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive and have denied the
right to a spouse to recover for loss of consortium. Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242
F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957); Thol v. United
States, 218 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Underwood v. United States, 207 F.2d 862
(10th Cir. 1953) ; Hartman v. Cold Spring GranTte Co., 247 Minn. 515, 77 N.W.2d
651 (1956) ; Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 295, 102 N.E.2d 444
(1951) ; Napier v. Martin, 194 Tenn. 105, 250 S.W.2d 35 (1952) ; Garrett v.
Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Ash v. S. S. Mullen, Inc.,
43 Wash.2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953) ; Guse v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403,
51 N.W.2d 24 (1952). See 2 LARSON, WOKEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 66.20
(1952).
The Hitaffer case has since been overruled insofar as it held that the wife
would not be barred from bringing an action against his employer for loss of her
husband's consortium. Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957). This result is probably sound in view of the
compromise nature of the workmen's compensation acts and the pervasive statutory
scheme of regulating these actions. See 2 LARsoN, WORatEN's COMPENSATION
LAW § 66.20 (1952).
A similar result has been reached with respect to the exclusiveness of the
remedy provided by the wrongful death statute on the ground that at common
law there could be no recovery for the death of a human being. Graham v. Central
of Georgia Ry., 217 Ala. 658, 117 So. 286 (1928) ; Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595,
77 Am. Dec. 72 (1860) ; Rogers v. Fancy Farm Telephone Co., 160 Ky. 841, 170
S.W. 178 (1914). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 694, comment (e) (1938) ; HARPER
& JAMES, TORTS 637 (1956).

The result here is not too inequitable in those states which allow the surviving
spouse to recover for loss of affection, e.g., Mississippi: Delta Chevrolet Co. v.
Waid, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So.2d 443 (1951). However, in those jurisdictions where
recovery is limited to pecuniary loss, the effect of this rule is to decrease the
liability of the defendant who manages to kill the spouse instead of maiming him
for life. In Alexander v. Botkins, 329 S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 1959), the Arkansas
court refused to follow the general rule and allowed a wife to recover for loss of
consortium in addition to her remedy under the wrongful death statute. And see
criticism of the majority rule in Comment, 30 IND. L.J. 276, 283 et seq. (1955).
21. 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1928). But see Hennessey v. Wahlig, 155 La.
465, 99 So. 405 (1924), in which an action for alienation of affections was apparently recognized. In Gaines v. Poindexter, 155 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. La. 1957)
the federal district court held that an action for alienation of affections which
arose in Texas would not be enforceable in a federal court sitting in Louisiana in
view of the fact that such an action was opposed to the public policy of Louisiana.
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support of any person except insofar as Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code expressly granted a cause of action for wrongful death to relations therein enumerated. 22 Since the Moulin decision, the courts of appeal and the federal courts have followed
the broad rule there enunciated and have denied any recovery
for loss of consortium resulting from the negligent injury of a
spouse. 23 It can be seen that Louisiana takes a position quite
similar to that taken by those jurisdictions which have denied
either spouse the right to recover for loss of consortium by reason of physical injury to the spouse. 24 It is submitted, however,
that this particular question has never been passed on definitively in Louisiana. This writer has found no reported case in which
the Louisiana Supreme Court has decided the particular issue.
The decisions of the Louisiana courts of appeal and the federal
courts denying such an action are apparently grounded on Moulin v. Monteleone.25 However, as that was an action for alienation of affections many of the reasons advanced for denying that
cause of action, such as the punitive nature of the damages in an
action for alienation of affections and the tendency of recognition of the action to encourage blackmail, are inapplicable to
the situation involving physical injury to the spouse. In addition,
one of the reasons given in the Moulin decision was that since
the action at common law was based on the husband's right to
the wife's services and since the husband had no such right in
Louisiana, the action should be denied. As with the common law
jurisdictions which retracted the husband's cause of action arising from physical injury to the wife after the passage of the
Married Women's Acts, this rationale overlooks the fact that
the service aspect became only one of the elements of consortium
20
as the common law developed.
In denying the wife recovery for loss of consortium, the
22. Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 178, 115 So. 447, 451 (1928).
23. Rollins v. Beaumont - Port Arthur Bus Lines, 88 F. Supp. 908 (W.D.
La. 1950) (citing no cases); Grier v. Tri-State Transit Co., 36 F. Supp. 26
(W.D. La. 1940) (citing Moulin v. Monteleone) ; Bea v. Russo, 21 So.2d 530,
533 (La. App. 1945) ("His claim for damages on account of loss of consortium
of his wife cannot be allowed in view of the present state of our jurisprudence
which does not allow or sanction an estimation of such value in monetary terms."
Citing no cases.).
However, the husband as head and master of the community has been allowed
to recover medical expenses (Chase v. Burley, 76 So.2d 587 (La. App. 1954)),
loss of the wife's earnings (Hollinquest v. Kansas City So. Ry., 88 F. Supp. 905
(W.D. La. 1950)), and the actual costs of a servant hired to perform the wife's
household duties (Lively v. State, 15 So.2d 617 (La. App. 1943)).
24. See cases in note 12 supra.
25. See cases in note 23 supra.
26. See PROSsEa, TORTS 704 (2d ed. 1955).
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Anglo-American courts have advanced several reasons for their
decision. First, it has been said that the injury to the wife is
too indirect and too remote.2 However, as the loss t6 a wife
would seem to be no less than the judicially recognized loss. to
a husband, this reason would seem to be without merit. Second,
recovery has been denied the wife on the ground that the' cause
of action is based upon the loss of the services of the spouse and
that as the wife has no right to the services of her husband, she
has no action for loss of consortium. 2 This view, however, is
subject to the criticism that although this aspect of consortium
may have been exclusive at one time, it has come to be merely
an excuse for granting recovery for the so-called sentimental
aspects of consortium - society, sexual relations, and conjugal,
relations. 29 Third, recovery has been denied on the ground that
recovery is a matter of policy which belongs in the realm of legislative action. ° This argument, however, would seem to lose
much of its cogency when viewed in the light of the historical
development of the common law and of the judicial policy of
expanding the law as the needs of society dictate. A fourth reason for denying the wife recovery rests on the view that judicial
recognition of a cause of action would have an adverse effect on
prior compromises and settlements with the husband. 31 However, it would appear that any undue detriment would be mitigated by the existence of statutes of limitations and the probability that the wife's loss of consortium was not included in the: settlement.
It would appear that the most convincing reason for denying
the wife's right to recover would be fear of a double recovery.3 2
27. Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Feneff v. New
York C. & H.R. R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909); Smith v. Nicholas
Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 108, 112 N.E. 204 (1913).
28. Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, Inc., 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933) ; Cravens
v. Louisville & N. R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922) ; Stout v. Kansas
City Terminal R.R., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913).
29. See PROSSER, TORTS 704 (2d ed. 1955).
30. Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958)
Franzen v. Zimmerman, 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 897 (1953) ; Ripley v. Ewell, 61
So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952) ; Larocca v. American Chain & Cable, 23 N.J. Super. 195,
92 A.2d 811 (1952) ; Nelson v. A. M. Lockett Co., 206 Okla. 334, 243 P.2d 719
(1952) ; Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) ; Nickel
v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205 (1955).
31. Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958)
Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952) ; Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles,
207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82 (1954) ; Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954).
32. See Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449
(1958) ; Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937) ;
Tobiassen v. Polley, 96 N.J.L. 66, 114 Atl. 153 (1921) ; Nickel v. Hardware
Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205 (1955).
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If the husband sues, he will recover for his own injuries, his loss
of earning capacity, and his loss of ability to support his wife.
Theoretically this does not include damages for the wife's loss
of consortium. However, it may be that the courts fear that the
jury in fixing the damages will take the marital status of the
husband into consideration and will include in the award compensation for the wife's loss. Consequently, to allow the wife to
recover in her own right would result in an overpayment to the
wife. It may be that this objection could be met by proper instructions to the jury and appellate review A better solution,
however, would appear to be to require that the wife join in the
same suit with the husband.35 Through this method both causes
of action would be decided at the same time and there would be
less likelihood of the wife's recovering twice.
In light of the status of a married woman in today's society,
it seems difficult to justify the unequal result reached by the majority position. Even after the Hitaffer decision paved the way
for recognition of a right in the wife, the courts have generally
been unwilling to extend protection to her interest. In view of
this, it would appear that recognition of her right may have to
come by way of legislative action.
George C. Herget, Jr
33. "See, e.g., Pennsylvania statute "Whenever injury, not resulting in death,
shall be wrongfully inflicted upon the person of the wife, and a right of action for
such wrongful injury accrues to the wife, and also to the husband, these two
rights of action shall be redressed in only one suit brought in the names of the
husband and the wife." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1621 (1953). The effect of this
sebtion has been suspended by Rule 2250 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure.

